resolution was adopted with 12 in favour, 2 against (Cuba and Yemen) and 1 abstention (China). Although the words “the use of force” were not used, it was clearly implied, as the United States maintained. The US said after the voting, “Today’s resolution is very clear. The words authorise the use of force.”[7] The Council gave “Iraq one final opportunity as a pause of goodwill” till 15 January 1991 to comply with the resolutions. This resolution was the first resolution since 27 June 1950 when the Security Council adopted a resolution that authorises the use of force in Korea.
What followed was a flurry of diplomatic activities undertaken by different countries and regional organisations. The UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar’s last-ditch efforts to persuade Iraq to withdraw failed. Then, the dateline of 15 January 1991 expired. On 16 January, nothing happened; like the lull before a storm. Then all hell broke loose on 17 January with allied forces pounding Iraqi positions. The start of air campaigns was reported by the US to the Security Council on the same day.[8] Saddam Hussein announced on Iraq radio that the “Mother of all Battles” had started. On 22 January 1991, the UN Secretary General appealed to Iraq to comply with the Council resolutions. Later on, he urged Iraq to put “this tragic situation on the road to a peaceful solution.”[9] Several private meetings of the Security Council were held during February and March. But these meetings could not yield any fruitful results.
On the morning of 24 February 1991, ground offensive started and soon, on 27 February, Kuwait was liberated. On 27 February, Iraq announced that it agreed to comply with the UN Security Council Resolution 660 of 1990 and all other resolutions.[10] Iraq also informed the Security Council of the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, while adding that “American and other pro-aggressor forces” are continuing their attack on the withdrawing Iraqi forces.[11] The coalition operations were stopped at midnight 27-28 February 1991. By 4 March 1991, the Kuwaiti Government resumed its functions in Kuwait City.
Looking back at Resolution 678, we can find some inconsistencies and discrepancies in its provisions. The wordings of the resolution – “use (of) all necessary means” was too vague in the first place, and this led to a number of interpretations. The US interpreted it as the authorisation of the use of force. It can be said that it was a US victory when the resolution was passed. In a speech before the resolution was put to vote, the US representative to the Security Council said, “If Iraq does not reverse its course peacefully, then other necessary measures, including the use of force, should be authorised.”[12] It can also be seen that the resolution was not in conformity with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter though the resolution stated that it acts “under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.” For instance, Article 42 (under Chapter VII) states that forces may be used only when the economic sanctions are inadequate. Article 46 states that “Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.” These provisions were not followed at all under resolution 678. It did not give enough time for the sanctions to take effect. This was also the Indian view.[13] The resolution also did not mention any Military Staff Committee. Moreover, with the abstention of China from the resolution, it failed to have the required concurrence of the five permanent members.
On 27 February 1991, it was President Bush who ordered the ceasefire and who proclaimed ‘victory’. The Secretary General, on 28 February said, “We hope it is the beginning of the end of this terrible tragedy.”
On 2 March 1991, resolution 686 was adopted by a vote of 11 in favour, 1 against (Cuba) and 3 abstentions (China, India and Yemen). While reaffirming that all the resolutions adopted before continue to have “full force and effect”, it laid down several preconditions for the ceasefire which Iraq was obliged to immediately implement. It also recognised that during the implementation of resolution 686, the right to use “all necessary measures” under resolution 678 will “remain valid.”
Resolution 687 was adopted on 3 April 1991 which finally and formally declared a ceasefire. This resolution was adopted by 12 votes to one (Cuba) with two abstentions (Yemen and Ecuador). Some of the main provisions of the resolution included guarantee of boundary and allocation of islands between Iraq and Kuwait, deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the demilitarised zone, destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all chemical and biological weapons and all ballistic missiles, UN inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical and missile capabilities, return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, payment of compensation by Iraq, continuation of sanctions, repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals, renouncement of the practice of terrorism and declaration of ceasefire.
Iraq called this resolution “unjust” and “iniquitous” and was “an unprecedented assault” on Iraq.[14] But Iraq, having no other choice, had to accept the resolution on 6 April 1991.[15] This resolution was also criticised in the following words: “It was not a negotiated agreement but a unilaterally formulated one, imposed on Iraq. The peace was dictated. The Council exceeded its powers because its Charter nowhere empowers the UN to impose a settlement on parties to a dispute.”[16] With the Iraqi acceptance of the resolution, the ceasefire formally came into effect.
Post-War Situation and the UN
Soon after the ceasefire, the UN took steps to actively participate in reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in Iraq and Kuwait. Several UN missions and teams went to Iraq and Kuwait to assess the humanitarian situation there. Their reports highlighted hunger, thirst, disease, desolation, destruction and death. According to one report, 170,000 children under five would die in 1991 because of the war and economic sanctions. It was remarked, “The situation was absurd. While UN and other agencies were struggling with totally inadequate resources to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, another UN body, the Security Council was insisting that Iraq be denied the opportunity to sell its own oil in order to buy food, medicines and other supplies.”[17]
A direct effect of the ceasefire resolution, particularly the continuation of sanctions was that “There now began a massive onslaught on the Iraqi civilian population – denied the means to rebuild a totally shattered social and industrial infrastructure, denied uncontaminated drinking water, denied medical facilities, and denied food in adequate quantities. The US policy represented one of the most comprehensive campaigns of biological warfare – denying relief to a diseased and starving people – in modern times.”[18]
Some more resolutions were adopted later that year – 688 (5 April); 692 (20 May); 697, 699 and 700 (17 June); 706 and 707 (15 August); 712 (19 September); 713 (25 September); 715 (11 October) – dealing with the post-war situation and reparation in Iraq.
In retrospect, it can be said that the Gulf War was not an UN war at all. The UN was marginalised on all occasions. It was the US that ran the whole operation. The US, it seemed, was clearly intent on using force right from the beginning. Even before the invasion of 2 August 1990, the US having knowledge of the threat did not warn the UN and made no efforts to stop it. It never directly negotiated with Iraq after the ‘storm’ nor was the UN asked to act as mediator.[19]
When the war finally came, the UN Secretary General remarked that “… the war in the Gulf is not UN war, and the World Body has no control over it… we are informed through the Security Council about military operation but after they have taken place.”[20] He also said, “We cannot consider it as an UN war in the sense that there is no UN flag. They are not in blue UN helmets. There is no UN control over military operations.”
Several peace plans came forward from different quarters, even from Iraq. However, none of them could succeed in bringing the war to an end, for; they are rejected by the US. The UN could do nothing. “The Americans had used the Security Council when it suited them, calling it into session again and again when Iraq invaded Kuwait and accepting resolutions critical of Iraq in order to ratify its own condemnation of Iraq. But once the war began, the Americans with enthusiastic British support, did all they could to stop the Security Council playing any part, and when they failed to hold the line, made sure its proceedings were in secret. Perez de Cuellar, who should have been a man at the centre of events, was never consulted and never informed of what was going on.”[21]
India and the Gulf Crisis
Historically, there have always been good relations between India and Iraq. Therefore when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, India was in a big dilemma. Neither did India want to offend Saddam Hussein nor did it want to go against the UN. India decided to toe the middle line for sometime by making a statement that, “India was opposed to the use of force in any form of relations between states.”
The major policy objective of India under Prime Minister VP Singh was the repatriation of the 170,000-180,000 Indians stranded in Kuwait. From August, Air India started massive airlifting operations and by October, almost
